- Meaning and Arguments in Context, 12 October 2012
Meaning and arguments in context
International colloquium
12 October 2012
Av. de Berna 26, Auditório 2 (Piso 3)
10.00 Opening
10:15 Christopher Tindale, University of Windsor, Ontario
Giving Meaning Presence
Abstract
In his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936), I.A. Richards raises the question of how words mean and explores it through an investigation of a new conception of rhetoric and a theory of meaning rooted in an individual’s experience with words (what they have meant in contexts). There is much to be learned from Richards’ suggestions, in spite of his dismissal of “old” rhetoric. In shifting his question to the domain of arguments and asking how arguments mean (rather than what they mean), I will explore the process of meaning transfer within argumentation with particular attention to how arguments contribute to presence. In the process, I will consider the theories on meaning of Paul Grice and Robert Brandom and suggest why a rhetorical account should favour the ideas of the latter over the former.
11:00 Chris Reed, University of Dundee
& Katarzyna Budzynska, Polish Academy of Sciences
Inference Anchoring Theory: Thereotical Problems, Linguistics Applications & Software Implementations
Abstract
The connection between formal theories of argument and inference on the one hand, and dialogical processes of debate and disagreement on the other is surprisingly understudied. Inference Anchoring Theory (IAT) provides, for the first time, a well-grounded account of this connection. It tackles a number of challenging theoretical issues, including argument that uses the statements of others (such as argument from expert opinion, position to know and authority), argument that involves ethos, and argument that is established purely in virtue of its dialogical context. IAT is also sufficiently robust to take on argumentation in unconstrained domains, such as discussion boards on internet fora. Finally, IAT is also the lynchpin in extensions to the argument interchange format, a computational standard for the representation of argument by machines, and those extensions are now supporting a raft of innovative, exciting software applications. These applications show how state of the art advances in the theory of argumentation in philosophy and linguistics can transfer to argumentative behaviour online and in the real world in a variety of domains.
11.45 Coffee
12.00 Marcin Lewiński & Dima Mohammed, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Meanings of ‘opposition’ in argumentation: Reconstructing public deliberation in a dialectical framework
Abstract
Dialectic has traditionally been a study of argumentation through opposition. Since dialectical issues have been defined by yes/no questions (“Is p the case, or not?”), a dialectical framework models discussions as a clash of two parties holding contradictory positions on a single issue. By contrast, public deliberations are typically multi-issue and multi-party discussions, where many contrary positions are discussed in response to open Wh-questions (“What is the best course of action a?”). Hence, the meaning of opposition in public deliberations differs from simple two-sided dialogues and so do the possibilities for their dialectical reconstruction. We investigate these possibilities and argue for an extended dialectical framework that – through notions such as sides, positions, cases, and simultaneous discussions – can be in a position to adequately analyse and evaluate public deliberations.
12:45 Lunch
15.00 Andrea Rocci, Universitá della Svizzera Italiana
The modal structure of standpoints
In argumentation theory the issue of modality has been mostly discussed with respect to the epistemic modality that accompanies the acts of putting forth a standpoint or drawing a conclusion. This kind of modality has been dealt with either in terms of illocutionary modification of the assertive commitment of advancing a standpoint or in terms of a quantification of the strength of support that premises offer to the conclusion. Other kinds of modality are generally not considered directly relevant for the analysis of arguments. The present contribution draws from a relational view of the semantics of modality to present a broader account of the relevance of the category modality for understanding the essential structure of arguments. Firstly, epistemic modal expressions are considered in relation to the inherent epistemic functioning of the speech acts of advancing a standpoint and of drawing a conclusion from premises. In particular, intersubjective epistemic modalities are examined as signs of the relationship between standpoint and starting point. Secondly, different kinds of non-epistemic modalities, including ontologic, deontic, practical-teleological and anankastic are examined in relation to an argumentatively relevant semantic typology of standpoints and as potential indicators of the argumentative loci relations underlying inferential connections in arguments. A brief exemplification of the relevance of non-epistemic modalities to argument is offered through an analysis of a passage of Martin Luther King’s historic I have a dream speech.
15.45 Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
The dialogical force of implicit premises. Presumptions in enthymemes
Abstract
Enthymemes have been described by Aristotle as syllogisms having a tacit premise, which are used as rhetorical instruments aimed at persuading the audience. How is the implicit dimension of rhetorical arguments related with their persuasive purpose? A possible answer can be found in the notion of plausibility of the premises. Rhetorical syllogisms are based on maximae propositiones that are only mostly likely; they mirror how reality usually is, or how it should be. For this reason, enthymemes are grounded on what people usually accept to be likely, from presumptions, not from knowledge. The presumptive dimension of enthymemes can explain its implicitness. The speaker presumes that a premise is accepted by the interlocutor, and for this reason he treats it as uncontroversial. This implicit move shifts the burden of proof onto the hearer, who needs to reject the move and provide evidence that the proposition taken for granted is in fact not acceptable or shared. The presumptive dimension of enthymemes is finally the cornerstone of kairos, which is the strategic aspect of rhetoric. The choice of a premise and the decision of taking it for granted becomes a strategic move aimed at transferring onto the conclusion the likeliness of a proposition, and shifting (and increasing) the burden of proof.
16.30 Concluding discussion
